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The Covid-19 pandemic has raised twin 
challenges for public revenue around the 
world. Governments have undertaken huge 
expenses to finance medical responses 
and social protection programmes. At the 
same time, tax collection is decreasing as 
a consequence of both pandemic-related 
tax breaks and a dip in economic activity 
and trade. These challenges raise the risk 
of unsustainable public debt – especially for 
many low- and middle-income countries. As 
a consequence, policymakers are seeking 
new sources of revenue to bolster state 
budgets. In this context ‘taxing the informal 
economy’, or ‘broadening the tax net’, have 
become popular talking points. In the early 
days of the pandemic, for example, Algeria’s 
President Abdelmadjid Tebboune suggested 
that new revenue raised from the informal 
sector was an alternative to international 
borrowing as a way of financing the crisis 
(Hamadi 2020). In recent months, this 
idea has appeared more frequently in 
policy conversations. Taxing the informal 
economy is, however, a very old idea. 
Tax administrations have been seemingly 
obsessed with registering firms and 
taxpayers for years (Moore 2020). 
It is not difficult to see why people should 
find the idea of taxing the informal economy 
attractive. In many low- and middle-income 
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economy is estimated to be informal. Analysts 
and policymakers often assume that informal 
enterprises are untaxed, and that there are 
substantial revenue gains to be achieved – a 
‘missing goldmine’ in the words of one recently 
published article (Monye and Abang 2020). 
Policies around taxing the informal economy 
are often vague, making it possible for them to 
claim to be reining in tax evasion without actually 
disrupting political or rent-seeking networks. 
More genuine enthusiasm around taxing the 
informal economy is often underpinned by 
a range of misleading assumptions about 
the benefits of getting informal workers and 
enterprises onto tax registers. This includes 
the argument that targeting informal economic 
operators will increase overall tax morale and 
compliance, raise the productivity of informal 
businesses, and lead to more accountable 
relationships between informal firms and 
governments. 
As practical experience and a range of recent 
scholarship have highlighted, however, many 
of these assumptions are not substantiated by 
evidence. The evidence shows that efforts to tax 
the informal economy typically:
1. Generate (considerably) less revenue than 
expected, in part because collection costs are 
high and tax payment does not necessarily 
follow from taxpayer registration.
2. Increase the extent of unfairness in the 
distribution of the tax burden – small informal 
sector operators already pay more in tax-like 
payments and fees than is generally assumed, 
while tax collectors often over-estimate the 
income potential of small firms. 
3. Fail to stimulate the accountability benefits 
often associated with taxation, because 
informal sector operators often find it 
particularly difficult to engage in collective 
political action in response to taxation.
It doesn’t raise much 
revenue
Taxing the informal economy is often expected to 
lead to substantial revenue gains – both directly 
from the newly-registered firms, and indirectly 
from positive spillover effects, as other taxpayers 
may perceive the system to be fairer and be 
more likely to comply voluntarily. Research has 
highlighted, however, that attempts to tax the 
informal economy typically result in only limited 
revenue, with the cost of collection often being 
higher than revenue raised (e.g. Benhassine 
et al. 2018). This is the result of at least three 
interrelated issues. 
First, while there is substantial revenue 
potential in taxing large firms and high net worth 
individuals within the informal economy, many 
efforts to tax the informal economy have focused 
on smaller firms. The reasons for this focus 
are organisational and political. It is possible to 
identify a large number of small enterprises, even 
mobile ones like street vendors, by deploying 
relatively unskilled tax collectors, including 
temporary staff, to tramp the streets, observe 
and ask questions. By contrast, the informal 
economic activities of larger businesses and 
highly paid professionals are much more difficult 
to identify. They often take the form of cash 
transactions that have been designed to leave 
no bank record, or payments that are recorded 
but made to fake or shadow entities for goods or 
services not actually supplied. The identification 
of these kinds of informal transactions requires 
skilled tax auditors who are able to interrogate 
business accounts effectively. People with 
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in the private sector, where they are used to 
minimise tax bills. They are not easily available 
to tax administrations. Further, initiatives to 
audit the tax affairs of larger businesses and 
professionals can quickly generate quiet but 
effective political lobbying and compelling hints 
to tax administration heads that they should ease 
off the pressure. At the same time, being able 
to report that a campaign to tax the informal 
economy has resulted in 40,000 newly-
registered taxpayers has more publicity value 
than a more complex narrative about success 
in narrowing the scope for evasion by already-
registered taxpayers. These organisational and 
political pressures can lead tax administrations 
to crack down on small-scale enterprises rather 
than focus on broader, and more profitable, 
informal activities. 
There is also consistent miscommunication on 
this issue. International organisations and tax 
policy advisers frequently urge governments to 
widen the tax net. This is in large part an indirect 
and diplomatic way of encouraging governments 
to stop giving away substantial revenue to 
companies or wealthy people through legal tax 
exemptions. But the message is too subtle. It is 
easily read by policymakers as a justification for 
increasing the number of registered taxpayers, 
rather than focusing on wealthier individuals or 
larger firms. 
Second, despite policy enthusiasm around 
taxpayer registration drives, an increasing body 
of evidence shows that taxpayer registration 
does not necessarily lead to tax payment. 
Recent registration drives have primarily led to 
a huge increase in the number of ‘unproductive’ 
taxpayers and tax registers riddled with imperfect 
information, with tax compliance only improving 
where there are additional enforcement efforts. 
These unproductive taxpayers (also known as 
non-filers and nil-filers) either do not submit a tax 
return or report no income, and consequently do 
not contribute to raising tax revenue. Reviewing 
evidence from six countries, Moore shows that 
more than half of taxpayers registered with 
African national tax administrations do not pay 
taxes at all (Moore 2020). 
Finally, there is little concrete evidence to support 
the idea that taxing the informal economy 
through tax registration drives actually has 
a positive spillover effect on the compliance 
level of other taxpayers, either in the short or 
long term. Instead, in some contexts it can 
fuel sentiments of unfairness, given that small 
businesses often face higher tax burdens than 
larger ones.
It’s often not fair
Proponents of taxing the informal economy 
often suggest that informal actors are currently 
under-taxed or actively evading taxes, and that 
they are therefore simply being asked to pay 
their fair share. This argument, however, often 
both over-estimates the income of many of the 
people involved, and under-estimates the taxes 
that they are already paying. Consequently, a 
push to tax the informal economy risks shifting 
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the informal economy 
typically result in only 
limited revenue, with the 
cost of collection often 
being higher than 
revenue raised.
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fiscal burdens onto some of the most vulnerable 
groups, thus undermining public perceptions of 
tax fairness. 
As noted above, many of the actors typically 
targeted by attempts to expand the tax net 
are small-scale operators with relatively low 
incomes, who would normally fall under most tax 
thresholds. More critically, despite longstanding 
assumptions that informality is synonymous with 
tax evasion, a growing body of research shows 
that informal firms already pay a wide range of 
indirect taxes, nuisance taxes, user fees and 
informal taxes. Rather than not paying their fair 
share, many of these actors already pay a high 
and often regressive burden to finance local 
public goods, operate their business, or avoid 
harassment by state and non-state actors. At 
the same time, many of the advantages that 
are often assumed to accompany formality – 
including access to social safety nets, credit 
or safer working environments – do not simply 
follow from a firm’s tax registration. Focusing 
on taxing the informal economy without 
understanding the nature of the broader fiscal 
landscape is therefore likely to shift the burden 
onto already vulnerable communities. 
This point is doubly important in the context 
of the current pandemic. Many of the groups 
generally associated with the informal economy 
have been particularly hard hit – not just by 
the health risks of the pandemic, but also 
by its economic fallout. Many have been 
disproportionately affected by lockdowns, as 
livelihoods reliant on face-to-face interactions 
or global value chains affected by the pandemic 
have shrunk or disappeared. Many have seen 
their savings depleted, assets sold, and have 
taken on substantial debts. As a consequence, 
and irrespective of their status in tax registers, 
policies that prioritise these groups as a target 
for revenue generation are likely to worsen 
inequality.
The links between taxation 
and accountability are not 
guaranteed
Building on theories linking taxation and 
accountability, it is often assumed that 
registering with state authorities and paying 
taxes or business licences will not only increase 
government revenue and fairness, but also 
increase civic and political participation and 
access to public services. Recent research has 
shown, however, that taxation only leads to 
improved accountability under certain conditions 
– including where taxpayers have the motivation, 
resources and power to make successful 
demands on their government for reciprocity 
(Prichard 2015). Workers in the informal 
economy may be particularly unlikely to meet 
these conditions, given that collective political 
action among informal operators is often limited, 
sometimes because governments actively 
oppose it. The ability to organise collectively may 
be particularly limited in the Covid-19 recovery 
period, given legal and administrative restrictions 
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A push to tax the 
informal economy risks 
shifting fiscal burdens onto 
some of the most vulnerable 
groups, thus undermining 
public perceptions of tax 
fairness.
There are better ways to 
finance development and 
the Covid-19 recovery
Taxing the informal economy neither 
guarantees substantial new revenue nor a 
fairer tax system. Instead, it risks increasing 
the burden on some of the most vulnerable 
groups. In the middle of an economic crisis, 
this would serve to reinforce deeply embedded 
societal inequalities. Building new fiscal 
relationships with individuals and businesses 
not previously registered with the tax authority 
may nevertheless be a desirable policy under 
some conditions – namely, when policies to 
tax the informal economy are better specified 
and targeted. Rather than broadly targeting 
the informal economy, or focusing attention 
on small-scale, low-revenue activities, policies 
should focus on identifying (a) large-scale 
economic transactions made in cash, (b) fake 
transactions in business accounts, and (c) 
higher-income inviduals that currently escape 
the tax net, including professionals such 
as lawyers and dentists. Meanwhile, closer 
state interaction with smaller enterprises 
and informal production clusters may be 
particularly constructive and valuable in the 
aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic – but this 
interaction should be seen in a developmental 
context, with a focus on investing, addressing 
vulnerabilities and building relationships with 
citizens, rather than solely extracting revenue 
from them. 
Meanwhile, there are other taxation strategies 
that are better candidates for raising revenue in 
the current context. Notably:
1. Taxing the wealthy – through income, property 
and capital gains taxes – is an underused 
but potentially effective revenue generation 
strategy in most low-income countries.
2. There is significant evidence that simply 
closing tax loopholes and addressing 
dysfunctional tax losses through corporate 
exemptions can lead to a substantial increase 
in revenue for governments.
3. Taxing digital transactions offers a promising 
way to target tax avoidance by big technology 
platforms, while recognising that these 
platforms have benefitted significantly from 
the increasing move to online interactions in 
the past year.
4. Increasing taxes to combat climate change 
may be a promising way for governments 
to raise revenue, while the costs to more 
vulnerable households or businesses can be 
minimised through rebates or other supports.
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